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7.1 Introduction
A central question for governments running medical care systems is
whether to allow people to supplement the public insurance policy. All de-
veloped countries insure a signiﬁcant part of the population through
public insurance. But not all services are covered publicly, or the services
covered may not be of the highest quality. Governments thus need to de-
cide whether people are allowed to purchase additional insurance to sup-
plement the basic package and, if so, under what restrictions.
Supplemental health insurance may be of three types. The ﬁrst, and
most straightforward, is for services that are not covered under the public
system. An example of such coverage is outpatient prescription drugs,
which are omitted from Medicare in the United States and Canada. The
second type of supplemental insurance is for the cost sharing required in
public insurance systems. Medical systems frequently require beneﬁciaries
to pay for part of the cost of their medical care utilization. If it is allowed,
recipients of public insurance may purchase secondary insurance to reduce
this cost sharing. The third type of insurance is for services that are covered
under the public plan but for which private provision might be preferred to
public provision. Because of tight budget constraints on service availabil-
ity, some countries have waiting lines for access to specialty services. Some
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of Economic Research.people purchase private insurance to see providers outside of the public
system, in eﬀect jumping the public queue.
These three roles for supplemental insurance are very diﬀerent, and thus
their economic implications are diﬀerent. Insurance for noncovered ser-
vices is the least controversial. In most countries, the public sector allows
or encourages such insurance. Such insurance may still have implications
for the public sector, however. There are two ways this may occur. First,
covered services may be complementary or substitutable for uncovered ser-
vices. As the price of uncovered services changes, therefore, the demand for
covered services may change as well. Second, the possession of private in-
surance might reduce poverty, reducing enrollment in other public health
and income support programs.
Insurance for cost sharing required in the public system is more com-
plex. On the one hand, allowing people to purchase such insurance reduces
their exposure to ﬁnancial risk, thereby increasing welfare. On the other
hand, insurance for cost sharing creates a moral hazard, much of which is
paid for by the public system. Because these public costs are not passed
back to individuals purchasing private insurance, insurance to reduce cost
sharing is in eﬀect subsidized by the public sector. Whether supplemental
policies to reduce cost sharing on net are welfare improving or decreasing
depends on how the public system by itself compares to the optimal policy,
and what the losses are from increased moral hazard.
Supplemental insurance for queue-jumping is perhaps the most contro-
versial type of supplemental insurance. Some countries, such as Canada,
prohibit physicians from accepting payment for services that are covered
by the public sector. The government is concerned that if such payments
are possible, the rich will buy increased access at the expense of the poor.
But both rich and poor may beneﬁt from this insurance, if increased de-
mand by those with supplemental insurance leads to increased supply of
medical resources.
This paper discusses these three types of supplemental insurance and
presents empirical evidence on the eﬀects of the ﬁrst two. The empirical
analysis focuses on the Medicare program in the United States, where sup-
plemental insurance is extremely common—about 85 percent of Medicare
recipients have additional coverage beyond the basic Medicare package.
This insurance is used to insure uncovered services (primarily outpatient
prescription drugs) and to reduce the cost sharing in the Medicare plan. In
the United States, queue jumping is not important (because supply is es-
sentially unlimited). I estimate that people with supplemental insurance
coverage paying for Medicare cost sharing spend about 35 percent more on
Medicare services than people without supplemental insurance coverage.
However, supplemental insurance also limits poverty among the elderly.
Keeping incomes high and thus keeping people oﬀ of other programs
oﬀsets nearly half of the moral hazard eﬀect. In total, allowing supple-
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but is not without beneﬁts.
The next section of the paper discusses the three types of supplemental
coverage theoretically. The third section presents basic information about
supplemental insurance in the United States, and the fourth section esti-
mates the impact of such coverage on medical care costs. The last section
concludes.
7.2 Interactions Between Public and Private Insurance
Imagine a situation in which the government is providing health insur-
ance to all or a portion of the population. The government has a beneﬁt
package that covers some services but not others. For example, the gov-
ernment might cover acute services but not long-term care services, or it
might require substantial cost sharing under the basic insurance plan. Ben-
eﬁciaries of the public program may want to supplement the public insur-
ance plan with private insurance. Three types of supplemental insurance
policies could be allowed.
7.2.1 Uncovered Services
The ﬁrst type of supplemental insurance is for services that are not cov-
ered under the public insurance program. Table 7.1 shows countries that al-
low supplemental insurance for this purpose.1 Among the Group of Seven
(G7) countries, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United States have sup-
plemental insurance for this purpose. In Canada and the United States,
theuncovered service is largely outpatient prescription drugs. In Germany
and Japan, uncovered services include amenities, such as private hospital
rooms, or minor services, such as eye and ear exams.
The public sector would appear, at ﬁrst glance, to be indiﬀerent to
whether this insurance is provided. But insurance for noncovered services
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Table 7.1 Use of Supplemental Insurance in G7 Countries
Country Use of Supplemental Insurance
Canada Uncovered services (prescription drugs)
France Cost sharing
Germany Uncovered services (amenities)
Italy Queue jumping
Japan Uncovered services (amenities)
United Kingdom Queue jumping
United States Uncovered services (prescription drugs); cost sharing
Notes: See Cutler (1999) for additional description. The United States row is for Medicare.
1. The entry for the United States is for the Medicare program.will aﬀect the public sector in two ways. The ﬁrst link results from service
complementarity or substitutability. Supplementary insurance lowers the
price of the services it covers. This price reduction will increase use of those
services. This will in turn aﬀect use of covered services, either positively (if
covered and uncovered services are complements) or negatively (if covered
and uncovered services are substitutes).
An example of this substitution is provided by the Medicare program in
the United States. As noted above, Medicare does not cover outpatient pre-
scription drugs. Some people who value coverage for prescription drugs
will obtain private insurance for it. Coverage for prescription drugs may in-
crease or decrease use of hospital and physician services, which are covered
by Medicare. If prescription drugs keep people out of the hospital (for
example, antihypertensive medication that prevents strokes), people with
private insurance coverage for prescription drugs will spend less on hospi-
tal care than will people without coverage for prescription drugs. If pre-
scription drugs are associated with increased doctor visits, however (for ex-
ample, for monitoring of antihypertensive medication), private coverage
might raise the costs of the public program.
Supplementary insurance for uncovered services also aﬀects the public
sector by altering eligibility for other public programs. In most countries,
low-income people are exempt from the cost sharing in public insurance
systems. In the United States, for example, Medicaid covers the cost of
medical care for low-income elderly with high medical expenses. Such
people may also receive additional income support or assistance with in-
kind goods such as housing and food. People who have coverage for sup-
plementary services are less likely to spend a large share of income on med-
ical care, and are thus less likely to fall below the income threshold. As a
result, having supplemental insurance coverage may reduce spending on
other public programs.
7.2.2 Cost Sharing
The second type of supplemental insurance is for cost sharing required
under the public insurance plan. When the public insurance plan requires
some cost sharing, people may be allowed to purchase insurance that pays
for these out-of-pocket costs. Supplemental insurance to reduce cost shar-
ing is common in France and the United States.
Allowing such policies reduces the ﬁnancial risk that people bear. If
public insurance systems are insuﬃciently generous, this is a welfare gain.
But such policies also have a clear moral hazard eﬀect. People who have in-
sured their cost sharing will use more services than people who have not.
For example, they may be more likely to visit doctors for routine care, or to
be hospitalized in precautionary situations. Some of this additional uti-
lization will be paid for by the private insurance, but other costs will be paid
186 David M. Cutlerfor under the public insurance policy. This will increase public spending on
medical care.
Imagine, for example, that a person has a hospital deductible of $500.
This deductible is suﬃciently high that when the person has pneumonia he
or she chooses to stay at home rather than entering the hospital. Now sup-
pose the person buys private insurance that covers the $500 deductible.
With no cost sharing required for a hospital stay, the person enters the hos-
pital for pneumonia. The ﬁrst $500 of this hospital stay is covered by the
private insurance policy, but the rest is covered by the public policy. If the
hospital stay costs $2,000, the cost to the public sector will be $1,500. In
eﬀect, the private insurance policy has induced moral hazard that is partly
paid for by the public sector.
The moral hazard eﬀect means that private insurance is implicitly subsi-
dized by the public sector. The cost of the private policy is the expected cost
of the $500 deductible, but the beneﬁt of the policy is the expectation of the
full $2,000 of medical services that it allows the individual to consume.
Three-quarters of the cost of supplemental insurance is paid for by the
public sector.
In such a situation, it is possible that increasing the generosity of the
public program may actually reduce overall spending on the public pro-
gram. I demonstrate this issue in ﬁgure 7.1.2 Imagine an individual facing
two possible health states: healthy and sick. Income is I in both states. An
uninsured person who is sick would spend m on medical care. Thus, in the
absence of insurance, the person will have consumption given by point A
in ﬁgure 7.1: I when healthy and I-m when sick. The solid line passing
through point A is the set of transfers that an insurance company can oﬀer
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Fig. 7.1 The decision to purchase Medigap coverage
2. The ﬁgure is based on the familiar Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analysis.the person while not losing money. In the absence of moral hazard, the line
would have slope equal to the negative of the inverse of the probability of
being sick.3 With moral hazard, the line has a ﬂatter slope, reﬂecting the
fact that medical and nonmedical consumption is diminished because of
the additional medical care utilization.
Imagine that public insurance is incomplete. For example, the public sec-
tor might oﬀer point B in the ﬁgure—income is smoothed, but there are
still substantial liabilities when sick. The indiﬀerence curve associated with
this insurance is also shown in the ﬁgure.
Suppose the person has access to a private insurance policy that provides
full insurance, but at some administrative cost. If a person pays amount L,
he can buy insurance to pay for the cost sharing in the public program. In
ﬁgure 7.1, the consumer will choose to purchase the supplemental policy.
Paying the transactions cost Lallows the consumer to reach point D, which
has higher utility than point B. The reason for the higher utility is that the
value of increased risk sharing is greater than the administrative cost re-
quired to purchase the policy.
If the public insurance policy were made more generous, however, the
supplemental policy would be less attractive. Imagine that the public pol-
icy were increased in generosity to point C. Utility at point C is higher than
at point D, even though point D oﬀers better insurance. The additional in-
surance is valuable, but not worth enough to overcome the transactions
cost. Thus, when the policy is made more generous, fewer people buy the
supplemental policy. Total medical spending will be lower at C than at D.
Even public-sector costs may fall, depending on how much of the in-
creased costs of policy D are borne by the public sector. For example, if re-
ducing the deductible to $250 would cause people not to purchase supple-
mental insurance but would lead to only half of the people with pneumonia
entering the hospital, public-sector costs could decline by making the pro-
gram more generous.
7.2.3 Queue Jumping
The third type of supplemental insurance is to ﬁnance services paid for
by the public sector but in a more timely manner. In countries with supply-
side constraints on medical service provision, as in most countries outside
of the United States, there are frequently waiting lines to access medical
services. Although emergency cases are often treated immediately, less ur-
gent cases might have to wait a year or longer for treatment. People who
place a high value on medical services might want to jump to the front of
the line.
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3. Suppose the person pays a premium Iindependent of health state and receives mof med-
ical services when sick. The insurance company’s proﬁt is given by   I– pm. In a zero-proﬁt
equilibrium, the amount of money received when sick is m –1/pper dollar of insurance pur-
chased.Imagine a situation in which a person has injured his or her hip and is
waiting for a hip replacement operation. Receiving the operation involves
two steps: consulting an orthopedist and then having surgery. In a supply-
rationed system, the wait for the orthopedist might be six months to a year,
followed by another half-year wait for surgery. A person who does not
want to wait in line may use private insurance to pay for a visit to an or-
thopedist. In countries that allow it, orthopedists will see patients outside
of the public system in a much shorter period of time—perhaps a week or
two. From there, the individual can join the waiting list for surgery in the
public hospital, just as if he or she saw the orthopedist under the public sys-
tem; or, in an extreme case, the insurance might pay for the cost of surgery.
At minimum, private insurance can, at little cost, reduce the waiting time
for surgery by half or more, without necessarily paying for the entire course
of treatment.
Rich people can aﬀord supplemental insurance more than poor people
and may value shorter waits more highly. The fear that queue jumping is a
device for the rich to get better medical care than the poor has led some
countries to ban this form of insurance and even ban out-of-pocket pay-
ments for services covered by the public sector. In Canada, for example,
doctors are not allowed to charge privately for services that are covered by
the public sector.
But the poor are not necessarily worse oﬀ. The reason for this is that
when people use supplemental insurance, some resources are freed up, and
total supply may rise at the same public expense. Imagine in the example
above that orthopedist appointments last one hour and that with no sup-
plemental payments, the orthopedist works from 9 ..to 5 ..When sup-
plemental payments are allowed, the orthopedist might still see publicly in-
sured patients from 9 .. to 5 .. and then see privately insured patients
after 5 .. Privately insured patients are better oﬀ, since they see the doc-
tor sooner. Patients with public insurance are better oﬀ as well, since the
doctor allocates the same time as he did previously but has fewer patients
to see. Publicly insured patients do not have as signiﬁcant a reduction in
waiting times as privately insured patients, but they are still better oﬀ.
Even if no individual doctor works more hours, publicly insured patients
might be made better oﬀ. When the rich opt to purchase services privately,
there are more funds left in the public budget, and thus a greater ability of
the public sector to expand total resource supply. If orthopedists see public
patients only from 9 ..to 4 .., the public sector can pay 12 percent less
(one out of every eight hours) for seeing public patients. With the money
that is saved, more orthopedists can be hired. Indeed, the public sector can
hire the equivalent of an additional hour for each orthopedist, making it as
if each doctor worked an hour more.
The case where publicly insured patients are worse oﬀ is when total re-
source supply remains the same but the rich get served more rapidly. For
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ment to the public sector, without a reduction in salary, patients left in the
public insurance plan will be worse oﬀ.
Of course, such an issue involves ethics as well as economics. One of the
rationales for government provision of medical services is that countries do
not want inequality in the provision of medical services (Cutler 2002). If
inequality of medical care resources is bad inherently, supplemental insur-
ance may be viewed adversely, even if the poor also receive more services.
7.3 Supplemental Insurance in the United States
I now turn to an empirical examination of the impact of supplemental
insurance on the public sector. My analysis is focused on the Medicare
program in the United States. Supplemental insurance for Medicare is
available for uncovered services and cost sharing. I describe this insurance
in this section and discuss its likely eﬀects. In the next section, I examine
the impact of supplemental insurance on public spending.
Medicare is the program that serves the aged and disabled population.
Ninety percent of Medicare recipients are over age sixty-four; 10 percent
qualify because of a disability. Most Medicare beneﬁciaries (about 85 per-
cent) are enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service insurance plan. This
plan, which is run by the federal government, has two types of beneﬁts.
Part A of the program provides inpatient beneﬁts, including acute care ser-
vices in inpatient hospitals and long-term care services, provided that they
are related to an acute episode of care. Part B of the program covers out-
patient services, including physician visits and laboratory services.
Table 7.2 shows information on payments for medical care services used
by Medicare beneﬁciaries in 1995, taken from the Medicare Current Bene-
ﬁciary Survey (MCBS). The top row shows that total spending for medical
services for Medicare beneﬁciaries was $8,500 per person. Two-thirds of
this amount ($5,697) was for acute care services, and one-third ($2,587)
was for long-term care services.
As the next row shows, Medicare pays for only about half of medical ser-
vices used by the elderly ($4,407). There are three reasons why the Medicare
share is so low. First, Medicare requires substantial cost sharing. There is a
large deductible for use of hospital care equal to the cost of one day in the
hospital—$788 in 1998. Furthermore, the beneﬁciary pays for cost sharing
for long-term hospital stays (above sixty days). For part B services, there is
an annual deductible of $100, with a 20 percent coinsurance rate above that
amount. There is no overall cap on beneﬁciary liability for Medicare.
This cost sharing is substantially greater than policies sold to the non-
Medicare population. In 1999, for example, the average private fee-for-
service policy for an individual had an annual deductible of $245. The coin-
190 David M. Cutlersurance rate was typically 20 percent, with a maximum out-of-pocket pay-
ment by the individual of $1,500 or $2,000 (Kaiser Family Foundation
2000).
The second reason why Medicare’s share of coverage is so low is that
Medicare does not cover outpatient prescription drugs. Prescription drugs
provided in a hospital are reimbursed as part of Medicare’s payment to the
hospital, but drugs taken on an outpatient basis are not covered by
Medicare. The lack of prescription drug coverage is a reﬂection of when
the program was enacted. In 1965, outpatient prescription drug coverage
was not standard, and thus Medicare omitted this beneﬁt. The program
has not been changed to incorporate this coverage, even though essentially
all private insurance coverage includes outpatient drugs. Medicare beneﬁ-
ciaries spend $568 annually on outpatient prescription drugs—half of
which is paid for out of pocket. The biggest item in out-of-pocket spending
for the elderly is outpatient prescription drugs.
The third reason why Medicare’s share of costs is low is that Medicare’s
coverage of long-term care services is limited. Medicare pays for long-term
care services only if the service is immediately related to an acute care
episode. For example, a nursing home stay to recover functional mobility
after a hip fracture would be covered by part A of Medicare, but a nursing
home stay related to general aging and lack of functional capacity would
not be covered. Long-term care provision in acute settings is a small part
of total long-term care utilization: Medicare pays for less than 20 percent
of total long-term care service use by the elderly.
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Source: Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey.
Note: Dental spending is not included in either acute or long-term care services. VA = Veter-
ans’ Administration7.3.1 Supplemental Coverage for Medicare Beneﬁciaries
For these and other reasons, many Medicare beneﬁciaries acquire insur-
ance to supplement the Medicare package. This insurance is provided
through one of four mechanisms. The ﬁrst source of supplementary insur-
ance coverage is from Medicaid. Medicare beneﬁciaries who are suﬃ-
ciently poor, or whose medical costs leave them with suﬃciently low in-
come, will be covered by the Medicaid program. Medicaid pays for the cost
sharing required under Medicare, outpatient prescription drugs, and long-
term care services, making it the most complete form of supplemental in-
surance coverage. As ﬁgure 7.2 shows, about 13 percent of Medicare re-
cipients are also covered by Medicaid.
Second, some employers provide coverage for services that Medicare
does not cover. Employment-based supplementary insurance is a combi-
nation of insurance for cost sharing and insurance for uncovered services:
It generally pays for the cost sharing required by Medicare and typically
outpatient prescription drugs, but not long-term care services. About one-
third of Medicare beneﬁciaries have supplemental insurance from a cur-
rent or former employer.
Third, individuals can join a health maintenance organization (HMO)
serving the Medicare population. HMOs contracting with the federal gov-
ernment agree to provide at least the Medicare package for an amount
roughly equal to 90 percent of average spending in the fee-for-service pro-
gram in that area. In practice, most HMOs have very low cost sharing for
service use—$10 per visit or less. Because HMOs enroll healthier people
than average, their costs are below those in the fee-for-service program. To
attract enrollees, HMOs oﬀer additional beneﬁts, including coverage of
outpatient prescription drugs. Nearly 15 percent of Medicare beneﬁciaries
are enrolled in an HMO, and about half of those have coverage for outpa-
tient prescription drugs.
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Fig. 7.2 Insurance coverage for Medicare beneﬁciaries
Source: MCBS (1995).Fourth, individuals can purchase private insurance coverage that sup-
plements Medicare, termed “Medigap” insurance. About one-third of
Medicare beneﬁciaries purchase Medigap insurance. The individual Medi-
gap insurance market is highly regulated. Since 1990, there have been ten
standard Medigap plans, the details of which are shown in table 7.3. The
most common policies are plans C and F, which cover cost sharing required
under Medicare and, in the case of plan F, balance billing charged by the
physician.4 The premium for these plans ranges from $1,000 to about
$2,500.
Three of the Medigap plans oﬀer some coverage for outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs, but these plans are not very popular. This unpopularity largely
reﬂects adverse selection. Plans with drug coverage cost about $700 more
than the plans without drug coverage, even with a maximum payment for
drug beneﬁts of $1,250 to $3,000. As a result of this adverse selection, most
people with individual supplemental insurance do not have coverage for
outpatient prescription drugs. Furthermore, long-term care services are
not covered by Medigap policies. Although there is some insurance for
long-term care, it is not very widespread (Cutler 2002): Only about 4 per-
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Part B deductible X X X
Physician balance billing X Xa XX
Emergency care outside 
United States XXXXXXXX
At-home recovery X X X X
Preventive care X X
Basic drug coverage X X
Extended drug coverage X
Price range ($)
Low 639 900 775 1,236 1,284 1,176 1,416 1,860 2,172 2,172
High 1,665 2,001 1,271 1,395 1,284 2,449 1,436 1,896 2,987 3,144
Notes: Basic coverage pays for coinsurance for long-duration hospital stays and coinsurance for part B
services. The at-home recovery beneﬁt is for cost sharing for long-term care services related to an acute
episode. Preventive care is up to $120 per year if ordered by a doctor. Basic drug coverage is 50 percent
coverage after a $250 deductible, up to a maximum beneﬁt of $1,250. Extended drug coverage has a max-
imum of $3,000. Prices are for a male, aged 65, living in Los Angeles County, and were obtained from
quotesmith.com.
aPays for 80 percent of balance billing.
4. Medicare calculates patient cost sharing on the basis of its fee schedule. Physicians can,
in some circumstances, charge more than the fee schedule. The entire amount of this excess
billing, or balance billing, is charged to the patient.cent of the elderly have long-term care insurance. Most elderly people rely
on the Medicaid program as their implicit long-term care insurance policy.
Eﬀectively, individual Medigap insurance serves as supplementary cover-
age to reduce Medicare cost sharing.
As ﬁgure 7.2 shows, in total nearly 90 percent of Medicare beneﬁciaries
have some form of supplemental insurance coverage. Supplemental insur-
ance coverage varies substantially with income, although the relationship
is not linear. Figure 7.3 shows the share of the elderly with diﬀerent forms
of supplemental insurance coverage by income. About 40 percent of the
poorest elderly (those with income below $10,000 per year) have supple-
mental coverage through Medicaid. Only 10 percent have employer-based
insurance, and 25 percent purchase insurance individually. At more mod-
erate income levels (between $10,000 and $15,000), individual insurance
predominates, with Medicaid coverage being relatively unimportant. Fi-
nally, at higher incomes (about $15,000 and particularly above $30,000),
most supplemental insurance is from employer-sponsored plans, with a
residual share for individual coverage.
As a result of these oﬀsetting trends, the share of the elderly with any
supplemental insurance does not rise particularly rapidly with income—
ranging only from 85 to 95 percent. What does change, however, is the
probability that an individual has coverage for the most important omitted
category in Medicare—outpatient prescription drugs. As ﬁgure 7.4shows,
the poorest and richest elderly are more likely to have prescription drug
coverage than are the lower-middle-income group. This lack of prescrip-
tion drug coverage for the nearly poor has raised substantial policy con-
cern (McClellan 2000).
7.4 Moral Hazard and Service Substitution
The question for economic research is how the presence of supplemen-
tal insurance aﬀects the costs of the Medicare program and the welfare of
Medicare beneﬁciaries. Queue jumping is not a concern in the United
States (supply is eﬀectively unlimited), but moral hazard and service sub-
stitution are. I thus examine how the presence of supplemental insurance
aﬀects medical care spending, taking account of both service substitution
and moral hazard eﬀects.
To test the impact of insurance for cost sharing on Medicare spending,
I relate Medicare spending for each individual to indicators for whether
the person has supplemental insurance coverage that pays for the cost shar-
ing required in Medicare. The moral hazard theory suggests that each of
Medicaid, individual Medigap, and employer Medigap insurance should
raise Medicare spending. To test whether coverage for prescription drugs
aﬀects spending on covered services, I include a separate dummy variable
for whether the person has prescription drug coverage. This eﬀect may be















































































































epositive or negative, depending on whether drug coverage is complemen-
tary or substitutable for the services covered by Medicare.
The regressions are of the following form:
(1) Medicare Spending    1   Medicaid    2   Individual Medigap 
   3   Employer Medigap 
   4   Drug Coverage   X  ε.
One could, in principle, include HMO coverage in equation (1), but data
on medical care spending are not reported for people in HMOs. Thus, this
group is omitted from the regression model.
The central diﬃculty of estimating equation (1) is the possibility of ad-
verse selection. If people who are sicker are more likely to obtain supple-
mental insurance, then it will appear as if insurance drives up medical
spending when in fact this is not the case. This is particularly important in
the case of Medicaid, where people enroll in the system because they are
sick. But the converse may also be true: Since richer people are more likely
to have private supplemental insurance than are poorer people, and richer
people are on average in better health than poorer people, supplemental
insurance may appear not to aﬀect Medicare spending when it might in
practice do so.
The selection problem is likely to be most severe for the Medicaid popu-
lation, since eligibility for Medicaid is largely determined on the basis of
high medical costs. I thus focus the analysis principally on private supple-
mental insurance. Even with this focus, the issue of selection remains.
Without an instrumental variable that is correlated with insurance pur-
chase but not with health status, there is no good solution to this problem.
I do not have such an instrument. Instead, I control for selection by in-
cluding a number of measures of health status in the X variables. If I can
adequately control for the factors about health status that predict insur-
ance choice, I will be able to estimate the moral hazard and substitution
components of supplemental insurance. The MCBS (1995) includes an ex-
tremely wide range of health measures, including self-reported health sta-
tus (excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor); trouble with hearing and vi-
sion (none, some, a lot, or deafness or blindness); whether health limits the
person’s social life (never, some of time, most of time, all of time); the num-
ber of impairments in activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental ac-
tivities of daily living (IADLs)5 (no impairments, IADL limitations only,
one to two ADL impairments, three to four ADL impairments, ﬁve or
more ADL impairments); whether the person ever or currently smokes;
whether the person has trouble eating solid foods; whether the person has
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5. ADLs are physical measures, such as the ability to bathe oneself. IADLs are functional
measures, such as the ability to manage money and cook.had a hysterectomy; and whether the person has been told by a doctor that
he or she has any of a number of chronic conditions (hardening of the ar-
teries, hypertension, angina pectoris, other heart conditions, stroke, skin
cancer, other cancer, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, arthritis, mental re-
tardation, Alzheimer’s disease, mental disorders, osteoporosis, broken hip,
Parkinson’s disease, emphysema, and partial paralysis). I include dummy
variables for all of these measures.
In addition, I control for demographic characteristics of the individual,
including age (in ﬁve-year age groups), sex, race (black, other), and the log-
arithm of family income.
Since medical care spending is skewed, there is a question about the ap-
propriate speciﬁcation of the dependent variable in equation (1). Sophisti-
cated models of spending use a two-part framework: a model for the use of
any services combined with a model for spending conditional on use of ser-
vices. For simplicity, I estimate only linear models of medical spending.
For the type of eﬀects I am interested in, this speciﬁcation seems appro-
priate.
The ﬁrst two columns of table 7.4 report estimates of equation (1). Col-
umn (1) does not include any of the health status measures: They are in-
cluded in the second column. Comparing the columns is an indication of
how important health-based selection into supplemental insurance is in
explaining Medicare spending.
The estimates on individual insurance and employer-based insurance
are generally similar in the ﬁrst two columns. Supplemental individual or
employer-based insurance raises Medicare spending by about $1,500
without health controls and $1,800 with health controls. In each case, the
eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In both equations,
I cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on individual and em-
ployer-based coverage are the same. Since selection into these two types of
insurance is likely to be very diﬀerent, these results lend some conﬁdence
to the idea that selection is not a particular problem in these results. Fur-
thermore, the coeﬃcients on both variables are remarkably similar with
and without the control variables. This further suggests that selection is not
a concern. Indeed, the increase in the coeﬃcients between columns (1) and
(2) indicate that selection into supplemental insurance coverage is favor-
able: The correlation between income, average health, and purchase of in-
surance is stronger than the selection into insurance by sicker people
within any income group.
I ﬁnd that, consistent with the concern about the endogeneity of Medic-
aid, controlling for health status substantially reduces the coeﬃcient on
this variable. In the second column, it suggests roughly the same moral
hazard as employer and individual insurance.
The magnitude of moral hazard implied by the estimates for employer
and individual supplemental insurance is high. Medicare spending is about
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Prescription
Drug Spending Medicare Spending
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Supplemental insurance (base = none)
Individual Medigap 1443** 1777** 121** 92**
(352) (346) (22) (20)
Employer Medigap 1697** 1799** 191** 146**
(444) (433) (27) (25)
Medicaid 4584** 2799** 14 –62*
(575) (568) (35) (36)
Prescription drug coverage –447 –194 117** 130**
(385) (372) (24) (22)
Self-reported health status (base = excellent)
Very good — 49 — 63**
(411) (24)
Good — 790** — 154**
(415) (24)
Fair — 837* — 215**
(503) (29)
Poor — 1730** — 195**
(703) (41)
Activity limitations (base = none)
IADLs only — –210 — 9
(446) (26)
1–2 ADLs — 2024** — 90**
(370) (22)
3–4 ADLs — 1580** — 27
(542) (32)
5+ ADLs — 3889** — 1
(627) (37)
Health limit social life (base = none of time)
Some of time — 953** — 83**
(371) (22)
Most of time — 1948** — 114**
(544) (32)
All of time — 5140** — 124**
(640) (37)
Smoking Status
Ever smoked — 837** — 36**
(309) (18)
Current smoker — 508 — –54**
(427) (25)
Trouble eating solid foods — 111 — 38*
(397) (23)
Ever had hysterectomy — 287 — 56**
(385) (23)




Drug Spending Medicare Spending
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Diagnosed conditions
Hardening of arteries — –126 — 54**
(405) (24)
Hypertension — –236 — 183**
(274) (16)
Heart Attack — 783* — 112**
(417) (24)
Coronary heart disease — 853** — 146**
(413) (24)
Other heart disease — 1046** — 85**
(321) (19)
Stroke — 488 — 8
(449) (26)
Skin cancer — –329 — 22
(363) (21)
Other cancer — 694** — 55**
(345) (20)
Diabetes — 3149** — 210**
(365) (21)
Rheumatoid arthritis — –253 — 79**
(419) (25)
Arthritis — –555** — 74**
(278) (16)
Mental retardation — –1719 — –150
(1671) (98)
Alzheimer’s — –1948** — –309**
(692) (40)
Mental disorders — 334 — 27
(657) (38)
Osteoporosis — 62 — 57**
(453) (27)
Broken hip — 914 — –73**
(612) (36)
Parkinson’s — 548 — 326**
(1065) (62)
Emphysema — 1498** — 216**
(356) (23)
Partial paralysis — 604 — –70**
(601) (35)
Trouble with vision (base = no trouble)
Little trouble — –764 — –9
(1673) (98)
Lots of trouble — 33 — –4
(300) (18)
Blind — 19 — 3
(481) (28)
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Table 7.4 (continued)
Prescription
Drug Spending Medicare Spending
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Trouble with hearing (base = no trouble)
Little trouble — –1806 — –301*
(2842) (166)
Lots of trouble — –714** — –12
(287) (17)
Deaf — –469 — 4
(518) (30)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,100 8,100 8,100 8,100
R2 .022 .095 .031 .193
Source: Data are from the 1995 MCBS.
Note: The sample is elderly people who are not enrolled in an HMO.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Dashes indicate that information was not in-
cluded in the model.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
$5,000 per person for this population. Thus, the increase in spending re-
sulting from supplemental insurance is about 35 percent. Other estimates in
the literature suggest that Medigap insurance raises Medicare spending by
about one-quarter. The higher estimates in these data may reﬂect an inabil-
ity to adequately control for selection, but the similarity of the coeﬃcients
between the ﬁrst and second columns argues against this explanation. The
large coeﬃcients in comparison to previous estimates may alternatively in-
dicate that the degree of moral hazard has increased over time.
The coeﬃcient on drug coverage does not suggest any clear eﬀect of this
variable on spending for covered services. Having drug coverage lowers
spending on covered services by $200 per person, but this eﬀect is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. I therefore conclude that lowering the price of pre-
scription drugs to the elderly does not materially aﬀect their use of
Medicare-covered services.
The coeﬃcients on the health status measures are generally along the
lines one would predict. Worse health is associated with increased spend-
ing. This is particularly true for self-reported health status (poor health
adds $1,700 per year); health limiting one’s social life (substantial limita-
tion adds $5,100 to spending); ADL limitations ($2,000 to $4,000 more);
smoking (smokers spend $800 more), heart disease ($1,000 more), diabetes
($3,100 more), and emphysema ($1,500 more).
As an additional test of whether insurance is accurately capturing in-
centive eﬀects and not just omitted health status, the last two columns of
the table report models for prescription drug spending. The theory sug-gests that people with supplemental drug coverage should spend more on
prescription drugs than people who do not have such coverage.
The estimates conﬁrm this theory. People with supplemental drug cov-
erage spend about $130 more on prescription drugs per year. The eﬀect is
similar with and without the controls for health status. The moral hazard
implied by this estimate is also large. Average spending on prescription
drugs is about $550 per person. Compared to this, the additional use for
people with employer insurance is about 25 percent.
Conditional on prescription drug coverage, people with employer and
individual insurance spend more on drugs than those with Medicare cov-
erage alone. Again, the coeﬃcients are similar on these two variables. This
is consistent with acute care and pharmaceutical use being complemen-
tary; encouraging people to visit the doctor more results in more pre-
scribed medications.6 Finally, Medicaid recipients consume fewer pre-
scription drugs, given their health state and their coverage for prescription
medications.
There is an additional path through which supplemental coverage may
inﬂuence public-sector medical spending. If people with supplemental in-
surance are less likely to incur high medical spending for out-of-pocket
needs, they may be less likely to enroll in Medicaid. This could reduce
public spending on medical care and other social services.
To examine this issue, I relate receipt of Medicaid to coverage for pre-
scription drugs. The equations are of the following form:
(2) Medicaid Coverage    1   Medicaid    2   Individual Medigap 
   3   Employer Medigap 
   4   Private Drug Coverage   X  ε.
A negative coeﬃcient on supplemental coverage would indicate that such
coverage prevents people from spending down onto Medicaid.
Table 7.5 shows the estimates of equation (2). As with the earlier equa-
tions, I include a variety of health status controls to control for selection.
Recall also that income is also included in the regression, so that the link
between supplemental coverage and Medicaid coverage is not a result of
diﬀerences in coverage by income group. Supplemental insurance is asso-
ciated with a signiﬁcant decrease in the probability of enrolling in Medic-
aid. People with insurance for Medicare cost sharing (employer or indi-
vidual) are about 25 percentage points less likely to enroll in Medicaid than
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6. Because these are uncompensated substitution eﬀects and not compensated substitution
eﬀects, the eﬀect of drug prices on other acute spending need not equal the eﬀect of other
acute prices on drug spending if the income eﬀects diﬀer. Having coverage for other acute
costs raises income suﬃciently to induce additional drug spending. The additional income
from having prescription drug coverage does not lead to any increase in use of other services,
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Table 7.5 Impact of Supplemental Insurance Coverage on Medicaid Coverage
Variable Coeﬃcient





Private drug coverage –.014
(.009)




Note: Regressions are for people aged 65 and older.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
are those without such coverage. Private drug coverage is associated with a
1.4 percentage point reduction in the probability of Medicaid coverage
(statistically signiﬁcant at the 11 percent level).
The implications of these changes are large. Consider the experiment of
giving everyone without supplemental insurance coverage a policy equiva-
lent to the average individual policy currently chosen, along with prescrip-
tion drug coverage. The estimates in table 7.4 indicate that spending on
Medicare covered services would increase by $473 per beneﬁciary. At the
same time, the estimates in table 7.5 indicate that this change would reduce
the probability of Medicaid coverage by 8 percentage points. Since Medic-
aid increases spending by about $2,800 per person (table 7.4), the savings
from reduced Medicaid utilization would be about $224 per beneﬁciary.
Thus, nearly half of the cost of supplemental insurance in higher Medicare
spending would be oﬀset by health savings in the Medicaid program. In ad-
dition, there would be savings in reduced income payments and potentially
other transfers as well, such as food stamps. The net eﬀect could be even
smaller.
As a result, encouraging people to purchase supplemental insurance
coverage privately—as Medicare’s implicit subsidy to ﬁrst-dollar coverage
does—costs less than the static moral hazard analysis suggests. And tai-
loring such policies to the group most likely to go on Medicaid may actu-
ally save money.
7.5 Discussion
The most important role of supplemental health insurance among
Medicare beneﬁciaries in the United States is to reduce cost sharing in theMedicare program. My estimates suggest that Medicare spending is in-
creased by about 35 percent for people with supplemental insurance cov-
erage over equivalent people without supplemental coverage. This estimate
may be somewhat high, because of omitted measures of health status, but
even a coeﬃcient half this size would imply signiﬁcant moral hazard.
Coverage for uncovered services does not have a direct eﬀect on public
spending. People with supplemental insurance that covers outpatient pre-
scription drugs spend no more or less on Medicare than do people without
such coverage. But supplemental insurance reduces spending through
other mechanisms by reducing eligibility for the Medicaid program. The
“Medicaid oﬀset” implies that the net cost of supplemental insurance cov-
erage is perhaps half of the gross cost, taking account only of Medicaid
spending on Medicare-covered services. Savings in other programs could
be large as well.
In some countries, although not the United States, there is a further role
of supplemental insurance in allowing people to jump to the front of wait-
ing lines. Because this role is not important in the United States, I do not
analyze it empirically. It would be worthwhile to consider this in future
work focused on other countries.
This research highlights the critical importance of the design of basic
beneﬁt packages. One reason why supplemental insurance policies are so
popular is that the Medicare beneﬁt package leaves substantial cost shar-
ing to the individual. It may be eﬃciency-enhancing to reduce the cost
sharing facing beneﬁciaries and thus reduce the ﬁnancial risk facing
Medicare beneﬁciaries without supplemental coverage. Estimating what
such cost sharing would optimally be and how it would interact with sup-
plemental insurance coverage is an important research priority.
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